A Fine-grained Account of Ontological Dependence
Several accounts of ontological dependence are available in the literature. In this work, I plan to frame the contemporary debate about ontological dependence, briefly introducing the modal account (M) of dependence---that for a long time has dominated the debate---and then showing that it is possible to identify some criteria to build a. better account from the mistakes made by (M). Afterwards, by assessing the most successful accounts (the essentialist and the foundational ones) of dependence, I shall show how they contribute to understanding that the source of the issues affecting (M) is the material conditional instead of the usual culprit, i.e. modality. Finally, I sketch a new formulation of ontological dependence that meets the criteria set by eliminating the source of the issues affecting (M). Here is my two-step plan: I employ truthmaker semantics to define a new conditional and then replace the material conditional in (M) with it.
Date / Time / Place
June 22nd / 18:25 / Aula 0A