Dated Truths Without Dated Powers
Dispositionalism is the theory that all metaphysical modal claims can be made true by actually existing powers. In order for the theory to be viable, it needs to be able to ground widely believed classes of modal truths. Among these, there are the modal sentences that make reference to a specific time. Call them “dated sentences”. Examples include "Possibly, it rains on Tuesdat 2nd", "It is possible that the mug breaks at 11, but it’s impossible that it breaks at 10.30". In this paper I consider two accounts available to the dispositionalist. I will argue that the most natural and straightforward way for Dispositionalists to tackle this phenomenon (the “Dated Manifestation Strategy”) incurs in serious difficulties. I then offer a better account (Duration Strategy). I will argue that this proposal has a few significant consequences for the metaphysics of powers at large, in particular with respect to the identity conditions for powers and the relationship between powers, time, and processes.
June 20 / 16:05-16:35 / AULA MAGNA