Michele Paolini Paoletti

Title

Not So Weak Emergence

Abstract

In her recent book Metaphysical Emergence, Jessica Wilson presents the following schema for weak emergence: a token feature S weakly emerges (on a given occasion) from a token feature P if and only if, on that occasion, (i) S cotemporally materially depends on P and (ii) S has a non-empty proper subset of the token powers had by P. In this talk, I shall reflect upon condition (ii). Following (ii), S inherits only a non-empty proper subset of the powers had by P. Assume, for the sake of illustration, that P has four token powers p1, p2, p3 and p4 and that S inherits only the proper subset made of p1, p2 and p3. Assume also that there is no further token feature distinct from S that weakly emerges (on that occasion) from P and that inherits one different proper subset of the powers had by P (e.g., the proper subset made of p2, p3 and p4). It seems that weak emergentism should perform two explanatory tasks here. First, it should explain why only the proper subset made of p1, p2 and p3 is relevant for the weak emergence of a token feature. Secondly and more importantly, it should explain why only the proper subset made of p1, p2 and p3 - and no other proper subset made of different powers - is relevant for the weak emergence of token feature S (on that occasion). By talking of “relevance for weak emergence”, I only mean here that the proper subset at stake must be appealed to when one tries to define the weak emergence of S from P. I shall explore three strategies to perform these tasks: primitivism, lower-level foundationalism and higher-level foundationalism. According to primitivism, there is nothing to explain here: it is a primitive fact of the matter that the proper subset made of p1, p2 and p3 is the only one that is relevant for the weak emergence of a token feature. And it is another primitive fact of the matter that that very proper subset - and no other proper subset - is relevant for the weak emergence of token feature S. According to microphysical foundationalism, both facts are explained by only appealing to P and/or to further entities at the level of P. Finally, according to higher-level foundationalism, both facts are explained (also or only) by appealing to S and/or to further entities at the level of S. I shall argue that higher-level foundationalism is the best strategy. However, higher-level foundationalism results in strengthening weak emergence. Indeed, it implies that S and/or further entities at the level of S play an ineliminable explanatory role. This may be at odds with the compatibility between weak emergence, on the one hand, and physicalism, on the other hand. For the relevance of the proper subset made of physical powers p1, p2 and p3 turns out to be explained by appealing to higher-level entities such as S. To overcome this difficulty, I shall suggest that one should embrace metaontological pluralism, i.e., the view according to which there are multiple and non-equivalent dependence relations between entities. On the one hand, roughly, S depends upon P in certain respects, as specified by condition (i). Moreover, whatever can causally depend upon S must already be causally dependent upon P. However, on the other hand, there is something else (i.e., that the proper subset made of p1, p2 and p3 is relevant for the weak emergence of S) that also or only depends upon S and/or upon further higher-level features - and not upon P and/or upon further lower-level features.

Date / Time / Place

June 21st / 15:30 / Aula Magna