Exact truthmaking and self-reference: a model for self-applicable exact truthmaking
An exact truthmaker for a sentence A is a state (situation, event, action, . . . ) which necessitates A’s truth while being wholly relevant for A’s truth. For example, the ball being red is an exact truthmaker for “the ball is colored”. The complex state of the ball being red and round, in contrast, is not an exact truthmaker, since the ball’s shape is irrelevant to whether it’s colored. In the present paper, we will show how to construct an exact truthmaking model for a first order language L containing two unary predicates "S(-)", "A(-)", whose intended reading is"being (the code of) a state" and "being (the code of) an actual state" respectively, and a binary predicate "||-" which bears (codes of) states to (codes of) sentences of the language, and whose intended meaning is "making exactly true". Exact truthmaking semantics has recently found applications in the semantics of natural language and in the semantics of hyperintensional contexts. As Barwise says, a semantics designed for these purposes should be able «to be turned on itself, and provide an account of its own information content, or rather, of the statements made by the theorist using the theory». Our framework will provide a solution to this challenge. Furthermore, it will make possible to reason about paradoxes of truthmaking, (e.g.: "this sentence has no truthmakers", "the truthmakers of this sentence are not actual", ...) providing diagnosis or solutions to them.
Date / Time / Place
June 23rd / 10:10 / Aula 0A