Xavier De Donato Rodriguez & Jose Falguera


Is Amie Thomasson’s Metaontology truly Neo-Carnapian?


Thomasson (2015) is known for her deflationary, easy approach to ontology and meta-ontology. She advocates for a simple realism in relation to the existence of disputed entities. In adopting a metaontological deflationist approach, Thomasson claims to be aligned with Carnap in his view on ontology. In order to defend such a position, Thomasson focuses on Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950 [1956]). However, she also applies her metaontological view to provide affirmative answers concerning the existence of entities which are the putative references of theoretical terms for those empirical theories considered to be correct. In so doing, Thomasson fails to consider Carnap’s position on scientific ontological commitments, developed in his (1956), (1958 [1975]), (1966) and (2000). This contribution thus aims at showing that Thomasson’s simple realism largely differs from Carnap’s position regarding scientific ontological commitments.

Date / Time / Place

June 22nd / 15:55 / Aula 0A