Concha Martinez Vidal


Quinean Lightweight Objects


Linnebo (2018) discusses a Frege-inspired conception of object that allows for thin objects and invites defendants of a Quinean-oriented view to propose their light or thin notion of object. Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment “to be is to be the value of a quantified variable” does seem compatible with a notion of existence that does not amount to much. The challenge comes from the way in which Quinean address metaphysical debates. Thin objects amount to a reformulation of Frege’s idea that there are analytic existence statements while allowing for thick objects whose ‘thickness’ may come from the kind of object in question. (Linnebo 2012, 140) We concentrate on Baron’s (2016; 2019) preferred reading of the Indispensability Argument that advocates for ‘light’ platonism—without further detail— to argue that while a mathematical explanation that mixes concrete and mathematical information is an explanation that makes demands on the world, the mathematics by itself does not make any thick demands. The mixed statements figuring in the explanation do. As a result, the mathematics in it seems to be thin relative to the thick (concrete) elements figuring in the explanation.

Date / Time / Place

june 21st / 9:35 / Aula Magna